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In this paper I challenge and adjudicate between the two positions that have come to prominence in the
scientiﬁc realism debate: deployment realism and structural realism. I discuss a set of cases from the
history of celestial mechanics, including some of the most important successes in the history of science.
To the surprise of the deployment realist, these are novel predictive successes toward which theoretical
constituents that are now seen to be patently false were genuinely deployed. Exploring the implications
for structural realism, I show that the need to accommodate these cases forces our notion of “structure”
toward a dramatic depletion of logical content, threatening to render it explanatorily vacuous: the better
structuralism fares against these historical examples, in terms of retention, the worse it fares in content
and explanatory strength. I conclude by considering recent restrictions that serve to make “structure”
more speciﬁc. I show however that these reﬁnements will not sufﬁce: the better structuralism fares in
speciﬁcity and explanatory strength, the worse it fares against history. In light of these case studies, both
deployment realism and structural realism are signiﬁcantly threatened by the very historical challenge
they were introduced to answer.
 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction: deployment realism and structuralism
This paper endeavors, ultimately, to examine structural realism
as an explanation for novel predictive success. A great lesson of
20th century philosophy of science is that evaluations of empirical
hypotheses are comparative and ultimately triadic: it is not merely
hypothesis versus data; it is rather hypothesis versus hypothesis,
with adjudication between them being focused in part on data. The
relevant data in my empirically triadic evaluation are those from
the history of science. And the foil against which I will compare
structural realism is the more robust, and arguably the most so-
phisticated, variant of scientiﬁc realism, deployment realism.
Before turning in the spirit of Laudan (1981) to the historical data,
we can compare these positions conceptually.
According to deployment realism, we can be justiﬁed in
believing the following meta-hypothesis: those theoretical con-
stituents that were genuinely deployed in the derivation of novel
predictive success are at least approximately true. The justiﬁcation
for believing this meta-hypothesis: it would be a miracle were our
deployed theoretical posits to achieve such successes were they not
at least approximately true. Deployment realism has much goingfor it. It is testable, as I will try to make clear below. It is applicable,
offering the promise of allowing us to identify, in at least some
instances, those constituents to which we can, according to
deployment realism, commit ourselves. And it appears to be
genuinely explanatory: credit for success is not due to those ele-
ments that were mere “idle wheels,” rather it is due to those and
only those that were responsible for the particular successful pre-
dictions. While the need for comparative evaluation is a central
lesson from 20th century philosophy of science in general, this
emphasis on the proper attribution of credit may be one of the
central additional lessons arising from the realism debate, in
particular. Forgetting either lesson would constitute a backward
step.
Worrall looking to Poincare embraces what he calls “syntactic or
structural realism” (1989, 157; see also 152), singlehandedly intro-
ducing it to the contemporary scientiﬁc realism debate. Structural
realism (hereafter “structuralism”) purports to be a logically
weaker, less committal, position than deployment realism: we can
be justiﬁed in, and need only commit ourselves to, believing the
structures expressed by those constituents genuinely deployed
toward success. Like deployment realism, structural realism ap-
peals to the no-miracles argument articulated above, but suitably
modiﬁed: the only explanation for novel success is that the struc-
tural elements of those constituents responsible for those successes
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requires that structuralism meets the demands met by deployment
realism. It must be testable. The structural elements of the deployed
constituents must be identiﬁable. And, in order to stand as a
genuine explanation of novel predictive successes, the structure
must be genuinely deployed toward the novel predictions. Beyond
embracing the same explanatory argument, structuralism shares
with deployment realism another feature: both Worrall and Poin-
care brought it in to deal with the history of science, in particular,
instances in which historical theories were successful but are
nevertheless now taken to be false. Although we cannot say that
Fresnel’s ether theory is approximately true, it was impressively
successful, predicting, for instance, the infamous white spot in the
center of the shadow of an opaque disk. How are we to make sense
of this success, given the rejection of Fresnel’s ether theory by
contemporary science? Worrall answers, “there was continuity or
accumulation in the shift, but the continuity is one of form or
structure, not of content” (157). Because structuralism is less
demanding, we should expect that, with respect to given instances
of novel successes, it fares better than, or at least as well as,
deployment realism. Offering an explanation for novel predictive
success, along with an ability to handle the historical data that
challenges traditional realism, structuralism purports to offer “the
best of both worlds,” to use Worrall’s apt phrase (1989).
The great question left byWorrall’s hint is, How precisely are we
to understand structure? It turns out that structuralism has a long
history. And, drawing on various early 20th century philosophers, it
has come to take on many forms. One might well claim that there
are more variants of structuralism than there are structuralists,
since a number of individual structuralists, Worrall among them,
have changed their positions. I anticipate that my historical con-
siderations below will not only pose threats to deployment realism
but will at least require clariﬁcation of some of forms of structur-
alism, if not signiﬁcant revision. The latter result, of course, would
invite even more variants.
Much discussion of structuralism has focused on a few sets of
historical theories: the successes of 19th century ether theories, e.g.
Fresnel’s, and quantummechanics, e.g. on the question of whether,
in light of that theory, the notions of individuality, objecthood,
intrinsic properties, etc, can be retained. Building on my (Lyons,
2006), the focus in this paper will be on the history of other cases
from the well-known arena of celestial mechanics, in which both
deployment realists and structuralists have tended to think their
position fares unquestionably well: I will start with a few com-
ments on Kepler, Newton, Leverrier and Adams, then move to
predictions made by general relativity. Examining arenas of theory
change that appear, initially, non-threatening to both the deploy-
ment realist and the structuralist, and then showing that those
arenas do pose a threat, reveals that threat to be especially pressing.
Since deployment realism and structuralism share those core
components captured above, my approach will be as follows: I will
ﬁrst discuss historical threats to deployment realism and then, in
due course, ask whether structuralism promises to do as well or
betterdor whether, by contrast, the structuralist is in just as bad or
(surprisingly, perhaps) worse shape given the particular historical
cases brought forward. We will see that, leveraged by those cases,
the structuralist’s need for the retention of structure compels the
structuralist toward increasingly vacuous conceptions of “struc-
ture.” The better structuralism fares against the historical exam-
ples, the worse it fares in content and explanatory strength. In light
of that problem of explanatory vacuity, the structuralist will be
compelled to embrace some explicitly restrictive notions of struc-
ture, against which, in Section 4, I will direct the cumulative force of
the discussion. The better structuralism fares in speciﬁcity and
explanatory strength, the worse it fares against history. The upshot:structuralists are trapped by their need for historical retention of
structure and their own explanatory demand.
2. Some challenges from the history of celestial mechanics
2.1. Preliminary cases
In his (1596)Mysterium Cosmographicum, Kepler articulated his
theory of the anima motrix, a theory that causally explained some
primary features of planetary motion. Because that text was
written years before Kepler met Brahe, it is clear that it was not
put forward to accommodate Brahe’s detailed data. And what we
ﬁnd is that, directly deploying its foundational posits, now taken
to be patently false, Kepler made a series of temporally novel
predictions. Toward the latter, seeking to explain why the planets
are moved in paths around the sun, he posited the following:
planets move only when forced to move; they could not move
themselves, because they would tire; the sun is unique and in fact
supreme, not by its size, but its divinity; it is positioned at the
center of the universe; the sun is that which pushes the planets in
their orbits; it emits rays that do the pushing, the anima motrix,
etc. Later, in a 1605 work, Astronomia Nova (1609), Kepler derived
from that theory the prediction that the sun spins: “since the
[emanation] of the source, or the power moving the planets, ro-
tates about the center of the world, I conclude with good reason.
that that of which it is the species, the sun, also rotates” (1609, p.
387). He also predicted that the sun spins in the direction of
planetary motion and that it spins along the plane of the ecliptic.
Returning now to his (1596), beyond providing a physical expla-
nation of why planets moved, he wanted to explain, why those
with a greater mean distance from the sun traverse their orbits at
a slower pace than those closer to the sun. To do this, he conjoined
to the above posits the hypothesis that, as the animamotrix pushes
the planets, its strength decreases in proportion to their mean
distances from the sun: “there is a single moving soul in the center
of all the spheres, that is, in the Sun, and it impels each body more
strongly in proportion to how near it is. In the more distant ones
on account of their remoteness and the weakening of its power, it
becomes faint, so to speak” (1596, 199). In answering how that
force diminishes, he invoked his hypothesis that the intensity of
light is inversely related to distance from the sun. Moreover,
“motion is dispensed by the Sun in the same proportion as light”
(1596, 201). From these, in conjunction with the posits above, he
arrived at his prediction that the sun spins faster than any of the
planets revolve around it (1609, 387e8). Further, the anima motrix
gave him “the reason and the means” to “defend” the “irregularity
in” the planetary paths: a “planet will be slower” when “further
away from the Sun,” where it is “moved by a weaker power,” and
“faster” when “closer to the Sun,” where it is “subject to a stronger
power” (1596, 217). This constituted the novel predictions that
planetary motion is non-uniform and, more speciﬁcally, that each
planet will reach its highest speeds at its perihelion and its lowest
at its aphelion. Brahe’s data conﬁrmed this for Mars, Jupiter, and
Saturn, rendering the predictions at least use-novel, and eventu-
ally for Mercury, Venus, and the Earth, instances of temporally
novel success. These predictions would later be accepted as
holding for the planets unknown to Kepler, Uranus and Neptune.
Although some of his predictions may have been articulated later,
the posits I’ve ﬂagged as pivotally deployed toward them predate
his access to Brahe’s data.
In his (1609), directing his theory of the anima motrix toward
what came to be known as his second law, Kepler supplemented his
reasoning with the posit that the planet’s own inclination to be at
rest takes over as the sun’s push diminishes (1609, 384). He also
looked to Gilbert’s theory of magnetism, reasserting, however, that
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attractive component: “there is in the sun no force whatever
attracting the planets, as there is in the magnet” (1609, 390). Each
of these constituents of Kepler’s deep theory were centrally
deployed in arriving at his “laws,” which were themselves central
to the unprecedented success of the Rudolphine Tables. Those laws
led to, and continue to lead to, innumerable successful predictions
pertaining to the behavior of, not only Mars and the Earth, but also
Mercury, Venus, Saturn, and Jupiter. Early on, Kepler achieved
additional temporally novel successes predicting speciﬁc relations
between the Earth, Sun, and planets: he predicted, not only two
planetary transitsdthe Mercurial, and the rare and irregular
Venusian, transitdbut also a short separation between the two
transits. And his laws led to, and continue to lead to, a multitude of
novel successful predictions regarding the then undiscovered
planets, Uranus and Neptune, the dwarf planets, and legions of
other bodies in the solar system and beyond. The reasoning Kepler
employed in arriving at these novel predictions centrally included
each of the patently false components of Kepler’s deep theory
identiﬁed above.
Beyond the predictions derived by Kepler himself, the deploy-
ment realist’s criterion requires that we credit Kepler’s laws, ob-
tained via the anima motrix, with other predictive successes. For
instance, they were utterly fundamental to Newton’s De motu cor-
porum in gyrum (1684), the pre-Principia text in which Newton
arrives at his revolutionary conclusion that planets are subject to an
inverse-square instantaneous action-at-a-distance gravitational
attraction to the sun. Newton posits that innate forces push masses,
which are otherwise unmoved, in a straight line inﬁnitely (Hy-
pothesis 2, 1684, 1). Asserting this to obtain for a single point-mass
in the universe, which moves in an ellipse, and deploying Kepler’s
second law, he shows that the required force toward a focus of the
ellipse would be inversely proportional to the distance squared
(Problem 3, following Theorem 3, 1684, 5). This is the fundamental
instance from which Newton generalized to arrive at his law of
universal gravitation. Newton required of that distance-force rela-
tion that it accord with Kepler’s laws, and its generalization
constituted the foundation for his law of universal gravitation: The
instantaneous action-at-a-distance gravitational force between
two objects is proportional to the product of their masses and
inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them.
Inmy (Lyons, 2006) I show that, by cumulative force, a set of at least
ten false Keplerian constituents must be credited with the novel
Newtonian successes identiﬁed below, and that to deny this would
sacriﬁce the content of deployment realism, leaving it arbitrarily
contrived.
However, notably, that is not the only point to be drawn from
our discussion of Newton. Newton deployed his own false posits
that were by no means idle wheels in the success of Newtonian
mechanicsde.g., a point mass is propelled forward by an innate
force; it is also pulled by an inverse-square force toward a focus of
its elliptical path; this constitutes the entire content and behavior
of the universe. Along with the Keplerian foundation, and byway of
Newton’s law of universal gravitation, the deployment realist must
credit thesedirrespective of how quickly they are contradictedd-
with a set of predictions that were at least use-novel, including the
slowing of Saturn as it passed Jupiter, the behavior of the tides, the
behavior of stellar objects, and the precession of the equinoxes. Nor
can these be denied a central role toward the successful temporally
novel Newtonian predictions pertaining to, for instance, the oblate
shape of the earth, the returns of Halley’s comet, many non-
Keplerian perturbations, as well as any number of recent pre-
dictions, such as the hurling of Apollo 13 around the moon and
other gravity assists such as those achieved in respect to Voyagers 1
and 2, etc.Soon after William Herschel discovered Uranus in 1781, it was
realized that its observed behavior failed to accord with pre-
dictions. In an extra-ordinary effort to causally account for the
discrepancies, both Leverrier and Adams successfully predicted the
existence of a trans-Uranian planet, never previously observed as
such. Moreover they made exceptionally accurate speciﬁcations of
Neptune’s position in the vast Autumn sky of 1846. John Herschel
reporting Galle’s observation, wrote “The geo-centric longitude
determined by Dr Galle from his observation was 325 530, which,
converted into heliocentric, gives 326 520 arc minutes, differing
0 520 from M. Leverrier’s place, 2 270 from that of Mr Adams, and
only 470 from a mean of the two calculations” (1849, 668). Most
signiﬁcantly for our concerns, each, working independently of the
other, deployed numerous false constituents toward their suc-
cessful predictions. For instance, the constituents each deployed
regarding the planet’s semi-major axis greatly exceeded today’s
value: Leverrier was off by six times the earth’s distance from the
sun (36.1539 AU); Adams by seven times (37.2474 AU). Related to
that, each deployed false constitutents regarding the distance be-
tween the semi-major axes of Neptune and of Uranus, Leverrier
being off by nearly 17 times and Adams’s more than 18 times the
earth’s distance to the sun. Regarding Neptune’s mass, Leverrier’s
value was more than double today’s, while Adams’s value was
nearly triple, the former off by over 18 times the earth’s mass, the
latter overreaching by nearly 33 times that mass. Furthermore, for
both, the orbit posited for Neptune was far too eccentric: Leverrier
exceeding 12.5 times (0.10761), and Adams 14 times (0.120615), the
present measure (0.00859).
Beyond, but related to, these central constituents, numerous
other false constituents were involved. For instance, for both sys-
tems, the orbital periods overshot Neptune’s current value by more
than half an earth century. And the constituent regarding the
longitude of the perihelion was dramatically falsed284, 450 for
Leverrier; and 299, 110 for Adams, compared with a present value
of 44, 58’. Finally, the predictions relied on any number of addi-
tional false constituents pertaining to Uranus itself, for instance its
mass, orbital period, eccentricity, etc. (Herschel, 1849, 669). Two of
the most astonishing temporally novel successes to be referenced
in the history of sciencedthe existence of a trans-Uranian planet
and its location as a point of light in the Earth’s vast skyddepended
on the large collection of false posits identiﬁed above.
2.2. Light, gravity, space, and time
Considering the great novel predictive successes of celestial
mechanics, we naturally step toward the successes of general rel-
ativity. Einstein wrote in (1916c): “Apart from” the prediction
regarding mercury “it has hitherto been possible to make only two
deductions from the theory which admit of being tested by
observation, to wit, the curvature of light rays by the gravitational
ﬁeld of the sun, and a displacement of the spectral lines of light
reaching us from large stars” (1916c, 123-4). Surprisingly, it turns
out that the latter prediction was made more than a century and a
quarter earlier, along with others generally attributed solely to
general relativity made in the same time period.
In 1784 John Michell predicted the spectral shift of light from
massive stars. Among his deployed constituents were the
following: light is not wavelike; it is made up of corpuscles; light
corpuscles have mass; light corpuscles follow the same laws as
matter; the speed of light varies; gravity affects “the velocity of
light” corpuscles emitted from a body (1784, 37); a luminous
massive object will exert a pull on the light corpuscles it emits, the
latter being “attracted in the same manner as all other bodies with
which we are acquainted” (1784, 37); the velocity of the light cor-
puscles will be decreased in proportion to the mass of the luminous
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corpuscles interact with an optical medium on a second body, e.g.,
the earth; velocity variation will bear on light refraction, spectral
shifts revealing a difference in the velocity of light corpuscles. Since
a prism provides a way to determine a difference in refraction, it
can inform us of a difference in the velocity at which light cor-
puscles are moving. With this line of reasoning we arrive at a novel
prediction, decades even before Fraunhofer invented the spectro-
scope in 1814: we can obtain information about the properties, e.g.,
the mass of distant stars by measuring “the refrangibility of the
light” (51). A second novel prediction is that a star with a largemass
will bring about a spectral shift when compared to one of lesser
mass. Related to this, we arrive at the prediction that we can
compare the masses of the stars in binary star systems “systems of
bodies revolving about each other” (56) by looking for a shift in
spectra.
Michell made another 1784 prediction regarding the possibility
of massive dark bodies. Deployed alongwith those constituents just
noted, e.g., the velocity of the light corpuscles will decrease in
proportion to themass of the stellar object, Michell reasoned, if that
object is sufﬁciently massive that its gravitational force overtakes
the velocity of the light corpuscles, the light corpuscles will not
escape: “all light emitted from” a sufﬁciently dense “body would be
made to return towards it, by its ownproper gravity” (42).With this
we arrive at the prediction that stellar objects of a sufﬁcient mass
will result in invisible dark stars. Moreover, their existence would
be indicated by other bodies revolving around them: “If there
should really exist in nature any bodies, whose. light could not
arrive at us. we could have no information from sight; yet, if any
other luminous bodies should happen to revolve about them we
might. infer the existence of the central ones” (Michell to Cav-
endish, 1783, qtd in Glendenning, 2007, 176; see also Michell, 1784,
50). In 1796 Laplace likewise made this prediction regarding dark
bodies and, even beyond that, arrived precisely at what would later
be called the Schwarzschild radius: Glendenning writes, the “crit-
ical radius” of Laplace’s Dark Body, “is R ¼ 2GM/c2, which is the
Schwarzschild radius of a black hole! (It is not clear to this [author]
why classical reasoning should have led to an exact result of Gen-
eral Relativity.)” (2007, 176).
General relativity’s prediction of the deﬂection of light in
conjunction with its conﬁrmation by the 1919 Eddington expedi-
tion may well constitute the exemplary instance of novel predictive
success. Howeverdotherwise unacknowledged in the realism
literature, as far as I can telldit turns out that this impressive
prediction had been made by Johann Georg von Soldner in 1801,
more than a century before the Eddington expedition was
conceived. In fact, beyond being anticipated by Cavendish in 1784,
Newton himself alluded to such a possibility in 1704: with “yes” as
the implied answer, he asked, “Do not bodies act upon light at a
distance, and by their action bend its rays, and is not this action
(ceteris paribus) strongest at the least distance?” (1704, 132). The
prediction itself is explicit in the title of von Soldner’s text: “On the
deviation of a light ray from its motion along a straight line through
the attraction of a celestial body which it passes close by.” The
theoretical constituents von Soldner deployed include the
following: light is not wavelike; it is made up of corpuscles; light
corpuscles have mass: “I treat a light ray as a heavy body” (von
Soldner, 1801, 948); light follows the same laws as matter: “Light
rays have all the absolute [basic] properties of matter” (translator’s
brackets, von Soldner, 1801, 948); the speed of light varies; an
instantaneous gravitational force affects the velocity of light cor-
puscles; more speciﬁcally, that force attracts light corpuscles: “The
light ray will. be forced [to curve], because of the attraction of the
celestial body” (von Soldner, 1801, 940). His prediction is that light
will bend around massive objects, and his more speciﬁc predictionis that it will bend at “0.84” seconds of arc (1801, 947; see Jaki,
1978.)
In advance of the Eddington expedition, Heber Curtis and Wil-
liamWallace Campbell, the head of the Lick observatory, conducted
eclipse measurements in 1918. During the 11 July 1919 meeting of
the Royal Astronomical Society, Campbell reported: “It is my
opinion that Dr. Curtis’s results preclude the larger Einstein effect
but not the smaller amount expected according to the original
Einstein hypothesis” (1919, 299), that smaller amount approxi-
mating von Soldner’s result. Although the results of that 1918
expedition were never published, Curtis wrote to Campbell: “My
own strong preference, however, would be to append. a brief
description of the plates, the measurements and the results.” He
offered the following: “The simple mean of the measurements
made on the Goldendale plates in both coordinates and of six plates
of the 1900 eclipse in declination is 0.0069 0.0002 for the deﬂection
at the Sun’s limb. When weighted in accordance with the values
assigned in the following short table, the value of the deﬂection at
the Sun’s limb becomes 0.0074  000.03.” After presenting the table
he writes, “the mean of the above results suggests the gravitational
deﬂection of 0.87 at the Sun’s limb.” (Curtis to Campbell, 29, 1920,
Dec; qtd in Earman & Glymour, 1980, 65e66). According to Earman
and Glymour, this is “the closest thing we have to a report of the
1918 expedition” (65). Later Eddington oversaw a six month
expedition to Sobral, Brazil, and the island, Principe, near Africa.
The Sobral experiments, reported by Dyson, were conducted on a
clear and sunny day, while Eddington’s own measurements were
made in Principe, where it was cloudy. Eighteen of the Sobral
astrograph telescope plates gave an average of 0.86 seconds of arc
(Earman & Glymour, 1980, 74). The results “conﬁrmed [Einstein’s]
theory only if part of the observations were thrown out and the
discrepancies in the remainder ignored. Dyson and Eddington, who
presented the results to the scientiﬁc world, threw out a good part
of the data and ignored the discrepancies” (Earman & Glymour,
1980, 85). “The blurred and dumbell-shaped images” of the only
“two usable plates” from Principe “were worst of all” (74) but gave
on Eddington’s analysis an average of 1.61 seconds of arc (75). The
18 astrographic plates from the Sobral expedition were discarded
due to the clear sky, determined in retrospect to be distorted by the
sun’s heat.
While on the topic of Einstein’s three central pre-
dictionsdhaving added “dark bodies” for good measuredwe
should note “The closing of a famous astronomical problem,” to
use the title of a (1909) article written by Campbell. The problem is
the advancement of Mercury’s perihelion. And since Einstein’s
general relativity was then unarticulated, the reader properly
anticipates that this is no a reference to that theory. Rather, it is a
fully Newtonian solution. The proposal was that the advancement
of Mercury’s perihelion is due to collection of individually invis-
ible planetoids. That postulate also predicted, in the use-novel
sense, instances of the glow in the sky’s horizon, before sunrise
in the east and sunset in the west. Simon Newcomb wrote, we can
“regard it as certain that, if a group of intra-Mercurial planets
exists, its members are too small to be seenwhen projected on the
sun’s disk.” (1911, 155). He wrote, “if the group exists the
members must be so small as to be [individually] entirely invis-
ible. But in this case they must be so numerous that they should be
visible [collectively] as a diffused illumination on the sky after
sunset. Such an illumination is shown by the zodiacal light.”
(Newcomb, 1910-1911, 155; quoted with brackets in Grünbaum,
1976, 356). Newcomb points to a version of Hugo von Seeliger’s
(1896) hypothesis: “In 1896 H. H. Seeliger made a more thor-
ough investigation than his predecessor [Newcomb himself] had
done of the attraction of the matter producing the zodiacal light,
assuming it to be formed of a series of ellipsoids. He showed that
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represented in this way” (1911, 155). Newcomb accepted von
Seeliger’s as the best hypothesis to date, “the most probable one in
the present state of knowledge” (1911, 155). That is also the hy-
pothesis that, in Campbell’s (1909) article, closed the “famous
astronomical problem.”3. Implications for structuralism: historical pressure toward
a problem of explanatory vacuity
3.1. The structure of light
We have now introduced a set of novel predictions that are
included among the most signiﬁcant in the history of science, and
we see that, toward each, sets of patently false theoretical con-
stituents were deployed. As implied, I take the preceding explora-
tion to pose serious historical challenges to deployment realism.
We can now focus on structuralism. Above, we saw that, since only
those components that are genuinely deployed toward novel suc-
cess can explain novel success, structure must be included in what
is genuinely deployed toward success.1 Generally, both structural-
ists and their critics take for granted that the virtues of structur-
alism are particularly apparent in the context of theorizing about
light, an arena of theorizing thus rendered ideal for identifying
challenges. We saw Kepler posit that sunlight diminishes inversely
with the distance it travels and very explicitly deploy this postulate
toward his determination of the changing strength of the sun’s
push. Both were posits of inverse rather than inverse-square re-
lations, and both were deployed toward a set of novel predictions
ﬂagged abovedfor instance, regarding the apsidal distance-speed
relations of planets, and toward Kepler’s incredibly fruitful second
law. Now take Michell’s prediction regarding the spectral shift of
light frommassive bodies, as well as his prediction of the possibility
of dark bodies, Laplace’s determination of the Schwarzschild radius,
and, ﬁnally, von Soldner’s prediction of light bending around
massive objects. Each of the previously articulated theoretical
constituents pertaining to light, among the entire set of constitu-
ents identiﬁed above, were deployed toward one or all of these
novel successes, and each is patently, and I will suggest, structur-
ally, false.
Scientiﬁc realists want to claim, minimally, not only that novel
successes of a successor system reveal a greater approximation to
truth than its predecessor system but that, as science advances
toward the truth, newer theories will fare better than their pre-
decessors on speciﬁc successful novel predictions. Moreover,
comparing Newtonian corpuscular theory against Maxwell’s later
wave theory, realists are compelled to take the latter as a signiﬁcant
advance over the former toward truth. However, given that a
massless wave is wholly unaffected by Newtonian gravity, each of
these novel predictions, along with each corpuscularian constitu-
ent responsible for it, is lost for a century. Quite to the contrary of
what realists expect, replacing falsity with what realist’s must
consider a greater approximation of theoretical truth results in a
century of loss of novel (and later successful) predictions. Nor,
however, can we say that those lost false theoretical posits
responsible for those novel successes express the real structure of
light. According to contemporary science, it is patently not the case
that, structurally, light obeys the same laws as matter; permits of
variability in its speed; can have a vacuum speed so slow as to be
overcome by the speed of gravitational attraction; possesses what1Moreover, because structuralists invoke the no-miracles argument and reject
non-structural content, for structuralists, as Psillos (1999, 153) points out, it is only
the structural content that can be genuinely deployed toward success.structurally amounts to mass; undergoes an instantaneous action-
at-a-distance attraction toward matter in an inverse-square rela-
tion to distance, etc. We have numerous theoretical constituents
pertaining very speciﬁcally to light that were deployed toward a set
of successful novel predictions but which cannot be said to accu-
rately express or even approximate light’s structure. This appears to
be a direct strike at the very context in which structuralism was
brought into the scientiﬁc realism debate, that of theorizing about
light, the context in which structuralism was introduced and is
taken to thrive.3.2. The structural relation between light, gravitation, mass,
distance, spacetime.
Of course, to allow for all of these false structural posits
regarding light, and needing to nonetheless reassert that structure
has been retained, our structuralist will now be prompted to
modify the meaning of “structure,” exploiting the ﬂuidity of that
key term.2 No longer able to explain the novel successes by a
conception of structure that pertains to light itself, our structuralist
may well hope those successes can be explained by the claim that
the relevant constituents properly capture the structural relation
between light, gravitation, mass, distance, spacetime, etc. For
instance, our structuralist might suggest that “light follows the
same laws as matter” structurally approximates the contemporary
speciﬁcation that “light, no less than matter, follows the warping of
spacetime.”
Addressing this prima facie promising response requires
attending to the nature of the shift from Newtonian to relativistic
structure. Notably, as with explicit discussions restricted to the
nature of light, we again enter an arena taken to exhibit the ad-
vantages of structuralism. For instance, thoughWorrall emphasizes
radical content change between the Newtonian and relativistic
conceptions (1989, 143 and 148), he introduces his structuralism as
the best of both worlds, purporting to permit that shift while also
capturing the no-miracles intuition. Our present query is whether
that shift also involved radical structural change.
Newton writes, while “the common people [or “the vulgur”]
conceive” such “quantities” as space and time “under no other
notions but from the relation they bear to sensible objects” (6),
beneath these relative notions lie the absolutes, the permanent and
immovable. Speciﬁc “times and spaces are, as it were, the places as
well of themselves as of all other things” (1687, 8). The “parts of
space” are ordered immutably (8). Space depends on nothing else,
is “of its own nature” and non-relational, “without reference to
anything external.” It “always remains similar,” is entirely homo-
geneous. Space “always remains. immovable.” It is permanent as
it is, and there is nothing into which it could move (6). Time is
likewise absolute, “of itself,” subsisting “without regard to anything
external,” unaffected and independently ﬂowing “from its own
nature” (6), its “parts” ordered so as to be “immutable” (8). Struc-
turally, both space and time are inﬁnite, independent of one
another, and independent of everything else, for instance, light.
Events occur in deﬁnite immutable “parts” of space and time. As for
motion and rest: “Absolute motion is the translation of a body from
one absolute place into another” (7); and “real, absolute rest, is the
continuance of the body in the same part of that immovable space”
(7). Within this absolute world structure, light, mass, and distance2Although, to give the structuralist the beneﬁt of the doubt against the case
studies, I will follow the structuralist in this retreat from speciﬁcity, in Section 4, I
will direct the cumulative force of my discussion against the key restrictions on
“structure” that structuralists have recently imposed.
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an action-at-a-distance force.
With the (temporary) exception of the gravitational force, spe-
cial relativity denies each such property of that metric structure.
Space and time become deeply entwined, their relation being
inextricably related to light; mass becomes mutually convertible
with energy, so not itself conserved, and as with distance, is altered
according to its relation to light and non-absolute frames of refer-
ence. All of this stems from Einstein’s revolutionary posit that the
speed of light is invariant irrespective of reference frames. It is
precisely on the reconceptualization of light that the relativistic
revolution against Newtonianism pivots. That is the difference that
makes all the difference. Though we may well all realize this when
pressed, I know of no other such acknowledgement in the struc-
turalism literature on light. General relativity ushers in even more
dramatic structural changes, its pivot point being the denial of
gravitation as an instantaneous action-at-a-distance force. While
special relativity may retain a global invariance of coordinate
transformations, with general relativity even that global structure
is lost: transformations become entirely local. Granted, at a given
“event,” provided we restrict ourselves to a local “patch,” away
from, say, a black hole, spacetime may be Minkowskian; however,
beyond local patches, information about spacetime structure at
least appears to require information about stress-energy-
momentum. Spacetime has, not only a variable structure, but a
seemingly dependent structure. And it is not merely that what
happens in spacetime is structurally dynamic, spacetime itself is
structurally dynamic. This constitutes a dramatic upheaval of
Newtonian structure, appropriately dubbed revolutionary. More-
over, those constituents on which this structural revolution pivots
are, I submit, the denial that the speed of light varies and the denial
that gravitation results from an instantaneous action-at-a-distance
force.
These points in hand, and returning to the speciﬁcs of our case
studies, we saw that Michell, Laplace, and von Soldner undeniably
included, for instance, spatial postulates in their reasoning. How-
ever, these have nothing to do with the structural curvature we
would now say obtains around a large mass. So even if “space is
absolute” was not genuinely deployed toward those Newtonian
successes, those successes are clearly not due to any posit regarding
the structure of spacetime as now understood. Moreover, we saw
that these Newtonians (Laplace aside) very explicitly deployed the
variability of the velocity of light, and in particular, its slowing.
Claiming that this argumentatively pivotal variation in c somehow
structurally approximates the absolute invariance of c depletes the
content of an indisputably central structural component of our
current conception. Further, we’ve seen that the invariance of c has
revolutionary implications for classical space and timede.g.,
converging the two into a single spacetime that is sliced in innu-
merably many ways, and “in”which mass/energy and distance vary
according to coordinate frames. We’ve also seen that those New-
tonian predictions depend on the slowing of light corpuscles that
are overcome by the instantaneous gravitational force. Combining
these points, those Newtonian successes depend on, not only the
absolute separation between space and time, mass and distance, so
space and mass, mass and energy, etc. but on each being individ-
ually absolute at least as contrasted against the relativistic concep-
tion, for shorthand, let’s say, contrastively absolute (as opposed to
“absolute in every Newtonian detail”), where, irrespective of co-
ordinate frames, it is determinedly not the case that time can be
dilated, spatial length can be contracted, and so on. The structur-
alist now appears forced to claim that contrastively absolute space
and contrastively absolute time, along with invariant mass, energy,
distance, etc., structurally approximate the extraordinary relativity
of spacetime slicing, the variance of mass, of energy, of distance, etc.However, such claims of structural approximation are at least as
problematic as claiming the signiﬁcant variance of light’s velocity
structurally approximates light’s absolute invariance. I proposed
above that those constituents that launch the structural revolution
are, with special relativity, the invariance of light irrespective of
coordinate systems and, with general relativity, the elimination of a
non-instantaneous gravitational force. To this we can add that, in
our contemporary system, what renders patently false the con-
stituents responsible for the Newtonian successes of Michell, Lap-
lace, and von Soldner are precisely those pivotal constituents of the
structural revolution. These points conjoined, that which makes all
the structural difference between the Newtonian and relativistic
systems is the difference between, on the one hand, the light
invariance along with force elimination constituents and, on the
other, the Newtonian constituents deployed toward novel success.
Not only are the resulting differences of the revolution structurally
relational (as above, e.g., independent space and independent time
versus structurally dynamic spacetime), so are the constituent-sets
that fundamentally differentiate the two systems. We have, then, a
structural relational revolutiondtwo relational constituent-sets,
one Newtonian the other relativistic, that render one another
patently false.
We’ve seen that the grand question arising in the context of
structuralism is, just what is it that we can justiﬁably believe our
theories have got right? I’ve argued that, by present theory, we can
claim neither that the Newtonians had the structure of light right,
nor that they had the correct structural relation between light,
gravitation, mass, distance, spacetime, etc. I am applying the his-
torical cases as pressure against the notion of structure, forcing a
notion of structure that is increasingly vacuous. This will be an
important line in what follows.
3.3. Equations that express structural relations
Having now addressed the structural disparity between New-
tonian and relativistic conceptions of the world, we are pushed to
address the question of just how general relativity accords with
structuralism, even setting aside those historical relations. Toward
that end, and an understanding of “structure,” it is noteworthy that
(more often than not, I dare say), the structuralist appears to equate
structure with a theory’s equations: “if we restrict ourselves to the
level of mathematical equationsenot notice the phenomenal
levele there is in fact complete continuity between Fresnel’s and
Maxwell’s theories” (Worrall, 1989, p. 158). Worrall explicitly draws
on Poincare who writes, “these equations express relations, and if
the equations remain true, it is because the relations preserve their
reality. They teach us now, as they did then, that there is such and
such a relation between this thing and that. The true relations
between these real objects are the only reality we can attain” (1905,
qtd in Worrall, 1989, 158). Outside of the Fresnel case, Worrall
writes, “On the structural realist view, what Newton really
discovered are the relationships between phenomena expressed in
the mathematical equations of his theory.” (1989, 162). So here at
least descriptions of relations, expressed in mathematical equa-
tions, are what we can justiﬁably believe and are what are retained
across theory change. In the ﬁrst sentence of Worrall’s launch of
structuralism into the scientiﬁc realism debate, the ﬁrst in his list of
“presently accepted physical theories” is “a curved space-time
structure” (1989, 139). He writes, “Most of us unreﬂectingly take
it that. those theories really do straightforwardly assert that
space-time is curved in the presence of matter” (1989, 139). When
detailing the justiﬁcation for realism, the no-miracles argument,
Worrall includes general relativity, in particular, as making so
“many correct empirical predictions” (1989,140; see also 2011,158).
Moreover, general relativity is, fundamentally, a single
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Additionally, the 8p is written into it to preserve, that is deliber-
ately accommodate, to some degree, an empirical core of the
Newtonian framework. Moreover, between the quantities on each
side of “ ¼ ,” that equation clearly expresses relations. Finally the
equation is directly tied to spacetime structure. Hence, looking to
identify a structuralist commitment, we appear to be on track. (And
mindful of both the need to explain success and the extraordinary
role general relativity plays in our current conception of reality,
structuralists who have been content to leave it to the side are
compelled to clarify just what in that theory their principles
commit them to.) However, consideration of the Einstein equation
itself reinforces our recognition of at least two serious problems for
the structuralist.
First, note that irrespective of the circumstances, or the values
put into, say, Newton’s inverse-square equation, Newtonian space
and time are wholly unaffected; as above, they posses an immu-
table, invariant, absolute structure. By contrast, elaborating on the
connection just noted, crucially, solutions to the Einstein equation
determine the description of how spacetime itself is structured;
spacetime itself can be contorted and twisted, so structured,
depending on the values put into the equation and the auxiliary
hypotheses to which the equation is conjoined. When contrasted
against Newtonian immutable space and immutable time, utterly
indifferent to the values put into Newtonian formulae, the inex-
tricable connection between the Einstein equation and spacetime
structure further illuminates just how fundamental and dramatic is
relativity’s structural upheaval.
The second major problem for the structuralist: depending on
the speciﬁcs of the solution, the Einstein equation can be used to
express innumerably many structured spacetimesdfrom those
consisting of a few massive objects to those with hundreds of bil-
lions of galaxies made up of hundreds of billions of stars; from
those that are static to those that are expanding and even those
accelerating in their expansion; from thosewith only visible matter
to those with dark matter and dark energy, and (to the surprise of
Einstein, initially) those that have no modicum of matter but are
nonetheless in motion. The Einstein equation can accommodate all
such worlds, all such spacetime structures, and more. The very
signiﬁcant implication: despite the apparent promise the Einstein
equation has for constituting structure, especially given its direct
connection to spacetime structure, we cannot equate it with, or
even claim it presents to us (using Steven French’s apt phrase) the
structure of our world. Were it to exhaust one’s beliefs about
macrostructure, we would have little if anything to justiﬁably
believe. It is structurally informative only when it is given values;
the structure it offers is contingent on those values, and, it would at
least appear, Einstein’s equation tells us only how the world would
be structured if the equationwere given values. Finding solutions to
that equation and auxiliaries pertaining to, for instance, matter is a
precondition for forging even a minimal connection between that
equation and our world of experience.
Because Einstein’s equation allows for so many solutions and
permits somanyworlds, it turns out to be incredibly difﬁcult to ﬁnd
values and appropriate sets of auxiliaries that will connect the
equation to any kind of actual experiences in this world. Due to its
extraordinary permissibility, not only is the Einstein equation
infamously difﬁcult to “solve,” the way and extent to which the
solutions that have been found actually relate to our world is often
extremely ambiguous. For instance, whether Einstein’s equation
genuinely implied the existence of black holes was debated for3 In accord with this point, I break from standard practice here and reference
“Einstein’s equation” in the singular.decades, both Einstein and Eddington denying that it did. Similarly
disputed were its implications for the existence of gravitational
waves. Eddington quipped that “the only speed of propagation
relevant to”dat least two out of three kinds ofdgravitational
waves is “the speed of thought” (1922, 269). To the considerable
surprise of most physicists (and the media) exactly one century
later, in a February 1916 letter to Schwarzschild, Einstein wrote,
“there are no gravitational waves analogous to light waves” (1916a,
196). And although Einstein soon argued for the existence of
gravitational waves, as early his (1916b) and (1918), he and Rosen
wrote a paper in 1936 inwhich he again denied their existence. (On
the latter, see Kenneﬁck (2005)). Illustrating the difﬁculty of solving
the equation, due to its lack of informative content: even when
gravitational waves were accepted as a genuine possibility, solving
the equation for physical situations that would render them
detectable proved extraordinarily trying.4 Warnings about the near
impossibility of doing so trace at least as far back as 1957, at the
Chapel Hill Conference. Charles Misner suggested one would need
“a computing machine better than anything we have now, and
many programmers and a lot of money” and that without the
proper speciﬁcation of precise “constraints,” “either the program-
mer will shoot himself or the machine will blow up” (1957, 87). A
half-a-century of effort and millions of dollars were put into
deploying computers and then supercomputers to solvedthat is,
conjure up the auxiliaries hypothesesdfor a situation inwhich two
black holes orbit one another and then collide, thereby producing
gravitational waves. Conference attendees Robert Lindquist in 1964
and Bryce Dewitt in the 1970s were among those who struggled for
such a solution. However, results continued to fall under what
essentially amounts to Misner’s second option. A sub-branch of
relativistic physics, numerical relativity, arose during the decades of
such efforts, and, ﬁnally, Frans Pretorious, after months with a su-
percomputer, and the courage, or audacity, to invoke a set of un-
realistically simple auxiliary hypotheses ﬁnally solved the problem
in his (2005), 90 years after Einstein had presented his general
theory. Following decades of claims that gravitational waves had
been detected (and a short time prior to this article going to proofs),
physicists announced with a clear consensusdin a paper with over
one thousand authorsdthat gravitational waves had been
“observed” by the LIGO detectors on September 14, 2015: “We
report the ﬁrst direct detection of gravitational waves and the ﬁrst
direct observation of a binary black hole system merging to form a
single black hole” (B. P. Abbott et al., 2016, 061102-1).
This difﬁculty in deriving empirically informative predictions is
a symptom of the fact that the Einstein equation permits so many
different worlds, and it helps us to see that, by itself, Einstein’s
equation cannot be equated with any kind of informative structure,
of spacetime or anything else. By way of values that can be inserted,
and auxiliaries to which the equation can be conjoineddincluding
those that invoke, say, invisible matter and invisible energydthe
equation, again, permits innumerably many spacetime structures.
As above, because the equation relates matter to spacetime struc-
ture, it does have implications for structure once auxiliaries per-
taining to, for instance, matter are articulated; however, because it
allows for any situation regarding matter, there is no particular
structure that the equation implies. Expressed in the context of
predictive success, so central to any warrant for structuralism,
Einstein’s equation by itself fails to render likely, let alone, entail, a
single temporally-novel or use-novel prediction about empirical
phenomena. In fact, by itself, it tells us precisely nothing about4And this is so even bracketing the related challenge of developing an appara-
tusdsuch as the Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory (LIGO)dthat
would allow one to detect them.
5Or, one might say, since the structuralist account of science renders the content of
science exactly as vacuous as the structuralist’s conception of “structure,” both are
now rendered vacuous indeed.
6 In fact, against the standard scientiﬁc realist, Worrall himself discusses the dif-
ﬁculty before putting it “into abeyance” (146, 1989). See footnote 7. And although
Psillos, a deployment realist, fails to address this as a problem for approximate truth
(Lyons, 2006, 556), he nonetheless appropriately invokes such a point as a chal-
lenge to structuralism in his (1999, 153-4). Albeit, like Laudan, niether invokes
historical counter-instances for leverage as I am doing here.
7 It may well be that, up until now, the reader familiar with these restrictions has
expected that they would solve the problems I’ve raised. In this section I hope to
relieve the reader of that expectation.
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the Ramsey sentence of, or percepts entailed by, the Einstein
equation is to believe nothing at all, since, by itself, that equation
has no Ramsey sentence and implies precisely no percepts.) Above I
suggested that, in our attempt to identify a structuralist commit-
ment, Einstein’s equation itself appears to hold promise. (And given
the signiﬁcance of general relativity, structuralists are compelled to
address it some way or another.) However, we now see that, were
we to equate Einstein’s equation with structure, the structure to
which we would commit ourselves becomes wholly unspeciﬁable,
and so utterly vacuous.
Although structuralism is taken to hold considerable promise as
an answer to the historical challenge to scientiﬁc realism, all of this
bears signiﬁcantly on the mounting threat I am continuing to un-
fold, the threat of the explanatory vacuity of “structure.” And one
reason I stress these particular points about Einstein’s equation is to
suggest that this perceived promise may often trade on the vacuity
of mathematical equations, Einstein’s being a particularly inter-
esting and illustrative example. It is not the only example, of course.
An inextricable connection to spacetime is not required. Consider
the posit of a trans-Uranian planet that led to identifying a point of
light in the sky. It is one thing to claim that planetary posit to be
purely structural; however, it is quite another challenge to claim
that Leverrier and Adams had the right structure. The posits
deployed pertaining to, not only the mean distance and the mass,
but also the eccentricity, orbital period, longitude of Neptune’s
perihelion, etc. were patently, and structurally, false. Similarly,
adding to our cases above, although Lagrange and Leverrier made
predictions about Venus that were in close accord, they did so by
deploying dramatically divergent constituents regarding Venus’s
orbit and mass. To claim victory over deployment realism on such
challenges, the structuralist will be tempted to exploit the free
Newtonian variables of mass and distance, each of which can be
adjusted, provided the other is adjusted, embracing the fact that
the relation between the variables nonetheless obtains. However,
discarding any speciﬁcs pertaining to mass and distance, no non-
arbitrary restriction on those values remains; in that case, to
exploit that relation, by itself, is to fall straight into the kind of va-
cuity suggested here. Moreover, even that degree of permissibility
may not sufﬁce for a historical retention of structure: since, ac-
cording to special relativity, any number of variations between
mass and distance can obtain depending on the reference frame-
dincluding for instance, the reference frame of the light we are
observing, over which our favored reference frame, explicitly, has
no greater privilegedit is wholly unclear that even special relativity
retains that Newtonian mass-distance structural relation, requiring
an even greater depletion of content in the notions of “relation” and
“structure.”
3.4. Depleting the content of “structure”
On that theme, returning now to our historical case studies,
wanting to claim that novel predictions result from obtaining the
right structure, our structuralist has no choice but to make the
notion of structure extremely open, allowing, for instance, that
pellets of mass structurally approximate massless waves, that an
inverse relation structurally approximates an inverse-square rela-
tion, that “the velocity of light changes” structurally approximates
“the speed of light is constant,” that “the velocity of light pellets can
be superseded” approximates “nothing can travel faster than c,” etc.
The slippery notion of “structure” (and the allure of the “abstract”)
may not prohibit any of this; however, crucially, the greater ease
with which such historical alleviations are purchased, the more
depleted and uninformative is structuralism’s content. Notably, in
discussing the structure of light, we have not yet added Fresnel’stheory into the mix. Forced by novel successes to concede that
Kepler, Michell, Laplace, and von Soldner got the structure of light
correct, and that Fresnel also got that structure correct, will render
empty the achievement of getting the structure of light correct. We
are seeing a mounting threat posed by the historical counterin-
stances: in want of accommodating them the structuralist is forced
toward an increasingly loose notion of structural approximation,
one that, with each stretch, threatens to commit structuralism to an
extra-ordinary depletion of the logical content of science itself: if
science gives us only such structure, it gives us extraordinarily little,
if anything at all.5 Emphasizing the absolute importance of struc-
ture, the structuralist is committed to claiming that, when an
instance of theorizingdfor instance, denying the variance of light,
denying the instantaneous force of gravitationdmakes all the
difference in the attempt to ﬁt our theorizing to the data and to
make novel predictions, that impacting difference will be a struc-
tural one. Moreover, again emphasizing the absolute importance of
structure, the resulting difference will generally be structural.
However, in each case where we had novel success we must
attribute that to the fact that we had the right structure; andwhere,
after such novel success obtains, a structural difference is intro-
duced because it makes all the difference to other phenomena and
novel predictions, the structuralist is committed to our having the
right structure not only after but crucially before that posited
structural difference. This is bound to drain “structure” of its con-
tentdand, so, drain it of explanatory strength: the structuralists
exploitation of the now increasingly apparent ﬂexibility of “struc-
ture” decreases the structuralist’s ability to claim that “getting the
structure right” will do anything to render novel predictive suc-
cesses “a matter of course,” to use Peirce’s phrase, or even likely.
Taken by itself, this mode of criticism is distinct from both the
historical and underdetermination argumentsdbut can be traced
back as a challenge to scientiﬁc realism through Lyons (2006),
(2003), to Laudan (1981).6 Here, however, I am using the above
historical challenges to leverage the point and to direct this prob-
lem of explanatory vacuity against structuralism.4. Structuralism and its most recent restrictions
To remedy this depletion of “structure” and rein in that threat of
explanatory vacuity, the structuralist is forced to impose severe
restrictions on structure. And structuralists have introduced re-
strictions.7 Most notably, perhaps, needing to give greater content
to his original (1989) hint at structuralism, Worrall’s current
structuralism is committed to, and only to, a theory’s Ramsey
sentence (Worrall & Zahar, 2001), (Worrall, 2007; 2011). This turn
to the Ramseyﬁcation of theoretical content is itself a dramatic shift
for his structuralism, and we would be remiss to neglect it here.
From considerations above, I will direct a series of challenges
against this dramatic shift. First, as we brieﬂy noted above, Ein-
stein’s equation, by itself, contains exactly zero observational con-
tent; since structuralist Ramseyﬁcations require observational
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equation by itself would be to believe exactly nothing. Or if wewant
to emphasize “percepts,” the set of percepts that Einstein’s equa-
tion entails is unequivocally empty. (So is the set from which one
can make an “upward” inference to that equation.) Now Worrall
appropriately recognizes the need for a system (2011), which we
realize will often include numerous auxiliary hypotheses, so avoids
commitment to the non-existent Ramsey sentence of Einstein’s
equation by itself. Nonetheless, second, theoretical systems them-
selves are continually evolving, and since a belief is a belief at a
speciﬁc time, there must be a speciﬁc time at which we are justiﬁed
in believing the system’s Ramsey sentence, and we are left
wondering just what time this would be. Were Einstein or
Eddington structuralists, one must wonder at which stage in the
evolution of the relativistic system would they have properly
committed themselves to its Ramsey sentence. Worrall’s own shift
to Ramsey sentences (Worrall & Zahar, 2001) takes place before,
say, Pretorious’s (2005) solution for gravitational waves as well as
the LIGO conﬁrmation (Abbott et al., 2016), each of which rendered
for the system a new Ramsey sentence, as I will note below. And
third, rather than repeat each case detailed above, I’ll simply point
out the following: among the entire collection of theoretical sys-
tems of constituents responsible for the successes detailed in this
paper, there is not one whose Ramsey sentence is not patently false
by present lights. In no such instance can the truth of the system’s
Ramsey sentence explain that system’s success. The divergent poles
of, on one end, explanatory vacuity, and, on the other, a failure to
account for counterinstances lead to the same result, an inability to
explain success.
Fourth, although general relativity and quantum ﬁeld theory
(discussed byWorrall in 2011) appear to be our best contemporary
theories, their conjunction is responsible for what appears to be
the most dramatic dand in the realism debate, as far as I know,
wholly unacknowledgedddiscrepancy between prediction and
data in the history of science: the predicted value of l diverges
from the data by up to 120 orders of magnitude. (See, for instance,
Frieman, Turner, and Huterer (2008, 20); Ellis, Elst, Murugan, and
Uzan (2011, 1); Murugan, Weltman, and Ellis (2012, 2e3).) That
given, our structuralist cannot even appeal to the Ramsey sen-
tence of the conjunction of our very best theories; even that
Ramsey sentence isdsurprisingly, to manydrendered patently
false by the data. Fifth, important to the comparative evaluation in
this paper, the fourth point leads us to another surprising result:
the deployment realist, whomakes no commitment to the truth of
a deployed system’s Ramsey sentence, may well fare better with
regard to contemporary science than our Ramsey-sentence
structuralist.
Sixth, althoughWorrall does discuss “in the limit” preservations
with regard to mathematical equations, this does not automatically
carry over to, say, truth-in-the-limit of the Ramsey sentence: for
instance, in that earlier text he acknowledges that the observation
statements derived from the Newtonian system fail to be, strictly
speaking, true (1989, 143, footnote 6). And insofar as “true” in the
limit requires truth in the speciﬁc observation statements, that
system’s Ramsey sentence cannot be, strictly speaking, true, even in
the limit. Seventh, this example also tells us that, although suc-
cessful predictions themselves may be true, even those extremely
limited “portions” of the Ramsey sentence that express the suc-
cessful predictions need not be true, and that, in fact, we cannot
insist that they are. (On this, see Lyons, 2003, 893-4.) Eighth,
mindful of these last points as well as the second point, regarding
the evolution of systems, and considering for instance, the details
of, say, the “Eddington experiment” or the claims of LIGO’s suc-
cessful detection, there are numerous auxiliaries that are articu-
lated after a test of a novel prediction occurs. For instance, as we allrealize, the conﬁrming observation claims relevant to LIGO depend
on other theoretical claimsdfor instance, the claim that no inter-
fering factors affected the laser interferometersdwhich in turn
depend on yet other observation claims, presumably also now part
of the Ramsey sentence. That given, the system’s Ramsey sentence
that is directly relevant to the novel prediction is not even articu-
lated until after the test of the prediction is completed (or, the
conﬁrmation of the prediction involves changing the system’s
Ramsey sentence). This is not to say that a not-yet-articulated
Ramsey sentence cannot be true; the point is rather that it cannot
be believed.
Because “true-in-the-limit” is bound to receive plenty of play
in the realist’s mind, as a ninth challenge to Worrall, we can pause
here to note that, not only Worrall, but realists in general, would
be mistaken to depend on “in-the-limit” qualiﬁcations. A quick
point regarding applicability (see Section 1): in-the-limit is a
comparative notion, with a later theory specifying just what that
limit is; but in absence of the future theory we cannot, of course,
use it to articulate a present commitment. Approaching this from
another direction, consider a new theoretical system, prior to any
evidence for it, along with the assertion that it is (say, structurally)
true-in-the-limit. Because “in-the-limit” is itself unrestricted, a
statement can be ascribed in-the-limit properties even though
that statement is patently (structurally) false. For instance, taking
the limit as the edge of a black hole, it can be, by contemporary
lights, true-in-the-limit “that there is no inverse square relation to
be had, that the universe is profoundly non-Euclidean, that
gravitation and acceleration are inequivelent, etc.” Likewise, and
more simply, “the earth is ﬂat,” “the entire universe is the surface
of a two-dimensional table” are, by contemporary lights, true-in-
the-empirical-limit, if not true-in-the-limit. However clearly, each
of these is also, by contemporary lights, patently false. With no
limits to, i.e., no restrictions imposed on, what can be designated
the limit, the qualiﬁcations “true-in-the-limit,” “true-in-the-
structural-limit,” “the-right-structure-in-the-limit,” or even
“true-in-the-empirical-limit” are bereft of informative content.
Although, in the face of the historical threat, such clichés may offer
momentary psychological comfort to realists, resorting to such
clichés sacriﬁces the explanatory argument on which the realist
justiﬁcation depends: in the end, falling back on such ad hocery
the structuralist claim need mean little, if anything, more than the
system is empirically successful where it is empirically successful.
Tenth, returningmore speciﬁcally to a structuralist commitment
to a system’s Ramsey sentence, Worrall himself rejects the realist’s
appeal to approximate truth (1989). In a thorough discussion of the
history of appeals to the Ramsey sentence, among the many sig-
niﬁcant challenges Simon Saunders and Kerry McKenzie (2014)
raise, but one (e.g. 149) is that it remains unclear just how a past
system’s Ramsey sentence would approximate that of another
system. Mark Newman, discussing a Lewisian conception of Ram-
sey sentences, argues that the false posits pertaining to “mass” will
permeate the Newtonian system’s Ramsey sentence (2005, 1383).
To Newman’s point, and in the spirit of Saunders and McKenzie, I
would add that this may well hold for Worrall’s “original, rather
than Lewisian” (Worrall, 2007, 149) Ramsey sentence; Worrall
writes, “the theoretical terms surely live on within the Ramsey
sentence via the structure that they impose on the observational
content. (That is, after all, what structural realism is about.)” (2007,
152). And a number of the false deployed theoretical posits iden-
tiﬁed above will likewise pollute the terms included in the Ramsey
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the “observation term,” “light.” If Worrall does embrace a move to
the approximate truth of a system’s Ramsey sentence, it will surely
require work, especially given Worrall’s own doubts about
approximation (1989, 156)8 and the fact that Worrall himself insists
that the only acceptable or even possible theory of reference is
“global descriptivism” (2011, 169). Eleventh, although recognizing
that his position borders on antirealism, Worrall contends that
much of what is included in the Ramsey sentence is theoretical.
However, given the collective force of pointsmade in this paper, it is
unclear whether, upon discarding all the falsity identiﬁed above,
anything would remain to distinguish Worrall’s position from anti-
realism. Finally, in conjunctionwith the third point above, in the off
chance that Worrall can somehow provide an account of Ramsey
sentence approximation that evades the many challenges raised
here (and in the papers just cited), he will be pressed to show the
deployment realist just why his notion of approximation cannot
equally be invoked to save the realist’s theoretical constituents,
threatening the primary motivation for his structuralism.9
Although my focus has been on epistemic structuralism, for
instance, the variants embraced by Worrall, I expect that my his-
torical survey has serious implications for other forms of structur-
alism, such as Ladyman’s (and possibly French’s) ontic variant.
Ladyman appropriately rejects appeal to a system’s Ramsey sen-
tence (2011, 100) and, beyond the empirical assertions,10 he appeals
to the system’s modal content, to its claims regarding, for instance,
physical necessity. Not only is this another set of restrictions
structuralists have introduced, it is that which distinguishes Lady-
man’s structuralism from anti-realism, e.g. that of van Fraassen
(Ladyman, 1998, 2000, 2011): denying such commitments, anti-
realism lacks the explanatory strength needed to make sense of
science (Ladyman, 1998, 416-7). This modal structuralism,
involving, for instance, commitment to a system’s assertions
regarding physical necessity, may well hold promise for addressing
the explanatory vacuity problem. Ontic though this structuralism
may be, it is, like its epistemic counterpart, also motivated by a
desire to address the historical challenge (Ladyman, 1998, 2000,
2011). The posit that nothing can travel faster than c, is, for Lady-
man, the sine qua non of physical necessity, and more generally, an
example of the kind of modal claim that our contemporary system
entails and to which the structuralist is committed. However,
considerations above push us to acknowledge that modalities such
as physical necessity are system dependent. And, crucially, we have
seen that, within the Newtonian system, the speed of light varies,
while the action-at-a-distance gravitational force is invariantly
instantaneous. Moreover, for Michell and von Soldner, it is that
invariantly instantaneous gravitational force that overcomes the
speed of light corpuscles in order to slow them down. Hence, a
brazen denial of the current posit that nothing can travel faster than
the speed of light is directly responsible for successful novel pre-
dictions we have traced from the Newtonian system. (Add to this,
other points from Section 3.2 on the dramatic structural clash be-
tween the Newtonian system and the contemporary conception of8Worrall notes, “Every false theory, of course, has inﬁnitely many false conse-
quences (as well as inﬁnitely many true ones)” and a theory that is close to the
truth gets some things “totally wrong” (1989, 145).
9 I suggest that, if he could provide some account of approximation, and if it is of
the right kind, the present paper would afford both a context and fuel for sepa-
rating his approximation from the deployment realist’s; but these are big “ifs,” and
until they are achieved, they do nothing to alleviate the many concerns raised here
for Worrall’s position.
10
For our purposes, we can allow this to be the very non-demanding claim that, say,
empirically successful predictions are approximately true.the relations between the invariance of c and spacetime, mass,
energy, and distance.). Our current theoretical system similarly
renders physically impossible a number of the deployed constitu-
ents we have identiﬁed above, e.g, that the constituents deployed in
Newton’s (1684) system obtain. The deployed systems we have
examined can and do, rather easily but no less dramatically,
patently defy the modal content of our contemporary theoretical
system. Nor does it appear that modal commitments permit the
kind of approximation or in-the-limit maneuvers we challenged
above.
5. Conclusion
In order to comparatively evaluate deployment realism and
structuralism, this paper has introduced a new set of historical case
studies. Needing to justify belief in their respective commitments
both deployment realists and structuralists depend on the no-
miracles argument. However, the explanatory demands of that
argument, combined with a careful look at the history of science,
reveal a serious tension between the commitments of, not only the
deployment realist, but also the structuralist. My claim is that, with
threatening historical data in hand, an inverse relation obtains
between the structuralist’s capacity for accommodating those data,
on the one hand, and the capacity to bear on, so explain, novel
predictive success, on the other; the speciﬁc historical challenges
introduced here reveal that securing one of these requirements for
a tenable position comes at the expense of the other. In terms of the
vacuity of equations, discussed above: their uninformative nature,
along with the structuralist’s explanatory demand, forces the
concession that particular values must be put into the equations.
Yet, we’ve seen, the better structuralism fares in speciﬁcity and
explanatory power, the worse it fares against history; and the
better structuralism fares against history, in terms of retention, the
worse it fares in content and explanatory power. Whether it be due
to a concession to miracles or to the elimination of content and
depletion of explanatory power, neither deployment realism nor
structuralism can explain the series of novel predictive successes
we’ve discussed, some of the most important successes in the
history of science. Either way, like deployment realism, structur-
alism, at least in the forms discussed here, is signiﬁcantly threat-
ened by the very historical challenge it was introduced to answer.
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